Universal Basic Income: A Necessary but not Sufficient Response to Crisis by Thompson, Matthew & Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place
Responding to COVID-19 in 
the Liverpool City Region 
Universal Basic Income: A Necessary but not 
Sufficient Response to Crisis
Dr Matt Thompson 
Policy Briefing 006 May 2020 
Policy Briefing 006 Page 1 
Map of Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (LCRCA) 
boundary (in red) and constituent local authorities 
Data sources: Westminster parliamentary constituencies (December 2018 - ONS), local 
authority districts (December 2018 - ONS), and combined authorities (December 2018 - ONS) 
 Policy Briefing 006            Page 2  
    
Universal Basic Income: A Necessary but not 




1. Universal Basic Income (UBI) could provide faster and more effective income support 
during the COVID-19 crisis than that offered under existing UK Government 
schemes.  
2. UBI may be harmful if used as an economic stimulus during the pandemic but prove 
useful for stimulating recovery after lockdown, especially in resolving the consumer 
debt crisis.  
3. In the long run, UBI faces a number of intractable tensions between maintaining 
affordability and delivering on diverse policy objectives – from empowering workers 
and providing an alternative to jobs lost to automation, to eradicating poverty and 
simplifying the tax-benefit system.  
4. UBI alone cannot bring about the revaluation of key worker roles, particularly care 
work; fails to address the structural roots of its target problems; and acts as a subsidy 
for asset owners, especially tech giants, without reforming the tax system required to 
fund UBI in the first place.  
5. More interventionist and state-entrepreneurial approaches – including investments in 
Universal Basic Services (UBS), place-based industrial strategy, technological 
innovation and skills training – could deliver much more effectively many of the 
benefits often claimed for UBI for a similarly significant level of public expenditure. 
 
1. Introduction  
With the COVID-19 pandemic causing 
chaos for work, welfare and healthcare 
systems across Europe, governments are 
searching for creative new solutions. 
Universal Basic Income (UBI) – an 
unconditional, non-means-tested, regular 
cash transfer from the state to all citizens 
regardless of employment, income or 
demographic status – is being promoted 
across the political spectrum as an 
emergency response. The Spanish 
government is reportedly taking steps 
towards implementing a UBI as a 
“permanent instrument” to help counter 
the economic fallout in Spain. In the UK, 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson is openly 
entertaining the idea of introducing UBI 
following a letter signed by over 170 MPs 
and Lords calling for UBI in response to 
the pandemic. Meanwhile, Rishi Sunak, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, has 
announced an unprecedented programme 
of government support for workers’ 
incomes, pushing the Tories 
uncharacteristically close to endorsing 
UBI. 
Calls for an emergency UBI to tackle 
COVID-19 have been issued by new think 
tanks The Institute for the Future of Work 
and Autonomy, alongside the Royal 
Society of Arts. A growing group of over 
500 leading academics and political 
figures calling for a global emergency UBI 
adds to the urgency. Even sceptics 
support an emergency £1,000 per person 
per month, citing favourable costs – just 
£66bn a month – compared to the £500bn 
bank bailout of 2008. This policy brief 
explores the social, economic and political 
implications of implementing some form of 
UBI both as immediate response to the 
crisis and more permanent policy solution 
to a number of problems, from rising 
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poverty and inequality to the transition to a 
more automated economy with fewer jobs. 
2. A radical response to crisis? 
UBI has great potential to address 
immediate needs in the wake of business 
closures, job losses, falling incomes and 
increasing hardship, as well as to provide 
a stimulus package for economic recovery 
as restrictions on mobility and consumer 
spending are eased in the following 
months. In the aftermath, it may give 
people the economic security they need to 
flexibly seek out new employment, training 
and entrepreneurship opportunities or to 
continue important care work. 
Part of its appeal is its supposedly simple 
administration as a universal payment to 
all citizens without costly and complicated 
means-testing. It could plug the gaps in 
the patchy coverage currently offered by 
the government’s income support 
schemes. The belated help offered to the 
self-employed comes with long time lags 
in payment and too many conditions 
attached, excluding new start-up 
businesses and entrepreneurs, gig 
workers, and those on zero-hour contracts 
– the precarious workers that need it 
most. A ‘minimum income guarantee’, as 
proposed by the Trades Union Congress, 
Citizens Advice, the New Economics 
Foundation and openDemocracy, would 
no doubt prove more effective. Emergency 
basic income seems necessary to protect 
livelihoods – but questions remain over 
what form it should take, how much, for 
how long and how universal. 
If used too hastily during the pandemic, 
however, UBI could pose health risks in 
encouraging people to start spending too 
soon, increasing exposure to the 
coronavirus. Incomes need protecting, 
certainly, but the point is to meet basic 
human needs, such as health, food and 
shelter, not inject markets with liquidity at 
a time when the economy has been 
purposefully put on ice.  
If implemented as an economic stimulus 
coming out of the lockdown, UBI could 
consolidate prevailing trends in consumer 
behaviour and working patterns to 
strengthen the competitive position and 
increase the market share of large online 
retailers and digital platform corporations 
like Amazon, at a time when small 
businesses are already facing bankruptcy.  
Although UBI would have a positive 
impact on the growing consumer debt 
crisis – initiating a modern debt jubilee – it 
cannot alone reform the underlying 
structural causes of mounting debt: falling 
real wages and diverging income shares 
between asset-owners and workers 
(Benanav 2019). With more cash in our 
pockets, what would stop landlords and 
other rentiers from simply hiking up rents? 
UBI effectively separates income from 
work but fails to separate income from 
assets, further inflating the unsustainable 
asset-based – and debt-based – economy 
of rentierism. 
3. Pros and cons in the long run 
If instituted as a permanent policy, studies 
suggest a number of benefits to UBI – 
notably eradicating poverty and 
homelessness, dramatically reducing 
inequality, alleviating stress and mental 
illness, reducing crime and domestic 
violence, and empowering employees to 
demand better working conditions and 
seek more meaningful and socially 
valuable work, even providing an 
alternative source of sustenance in the 
purported transition to a fully-automated 
post-work society. 
However, the evidence is mixed and 
based on speculative theorising, un- 
dynamic modelling and partial 
experimental data. Recent or ongoing pilot 
programmes in Kenya, Canada, Finland 
and the Netherlands will add to evidence 
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Figure 1. Example basic income pilots around the world 
 
Manitoba, Canada (1974–1978): World’s first basic income experiment. ‘Mincome’ paid to 
1,000 poorest residents in small town of Dauphin to raise above poverty line. Researchers 
found significant positive impacts on educational performance, hospital use, mental 
health, crime, and domestic violence, and insignificant impacts on working hours. Funded 
by provincial and federal governments but withdrawn prematurely with data left 
unanalysed until 2009. 
Barcelona, Spain (2017–2019): Pilot study of B-MINCOME focusing on lived experience, 
involving 900 people in 10 neighbourhoods in north-east of the city. Findings suggested 
improvements in household debt and sense of wellbeing, but little impact on employment 
due to limited local opportunities. Funded by the EU; coordinated by Barcelona City 
Council and the Young Foundation. 
Finland (2017–2019): World’s first statutory, nationwide and randomised unconditional 
basic income experiment, providing 2,000 unemployed Finns €560 per month. Findings 
suggest a small positive effect on employment prospects, much improved mental 
wellbeing and financial security, as well as greater confidence and trust in institutions. 
Coordinated by national social insurance agency Kela. 
Western Kenya (2017–2029): World’s largest and longest basic income pilot to date, 
providing 21,000 adults, across hundreds of villages, a third of average local income over 
12 years. Preliminary results expected sometime in 2020. Coordinated by development 
charity GiveDirectly, with funders including Google’s foundation. 
from earlier trial experiments in, for 
instance, Namibia in 2008 and India in 
2011 (Sloman 2018) (see Figure 1). But 
these are all limited in scale or scope – 
either based in particular cities, towns and 
villages, not yet an entire country; or 
targeting specific groups, such as the 
unemployed, rather than being genuinely 
universal. 
Nonetheless, leading advocate Guy 
Standing (2020) consciously positions UBI 
as the next big structural reform following 
the innovation of the welfare state. 
Invoking Beveridge’s quest to slay the five 
giants of his time – disease, idleness, 
ignorance, squalor and want – Standing 
claims a global UBI can battle the eight 
global challenges of our time: inequality, 
insecurity, debt, stress and mental illness, 
technological unemployment, ecological 
extinction, and populism and fascism. UBI 
is touted as a panacea for a plethora of 
problems, including pandemics, by an 
extremely diverse range of proponents. 
UBI, notes sympathetic critic Daniel 
Susskind (2020, 181), is one of those 
“rare policy proposals that make the 
political spectrum bend back in on itself, 
with people on opposite ends meeting in 
violent agreement.” In its various variants 
– from a vagabond’s wage and negative 
income tax to a social dividend and 
citizen’s income (Sloman 2018) – UBI has 
attracted support from ultra-right 
neoliberals, notably Milton Friedman, as 
well as Marxists such as Erik Olin Wright 
and radical feminists such as Kathi 
Weeks.  
The latest incongruous meeting of 
manifestos brings together anti-capitalist 
visions for ‘fully automated luxury 
communism’ with theses on the ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’ and ‘the coming 
machine age’ promulgated by Silicon 
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Valley, not least Mark Zuckerberg and 
Elon Musk, who believes UBI is 
“increasingly necessary” (Benanav 2019). 
When anti-capitalist techno-utopians and 
hyper-capitalist plutocrats all agree on 
something, our critical hackles should be 
raised. 
By promising so much to so many, and 
attempting to please political factions 
otherwise pitted against each other, UBI 
inevitably falls short. It is caught in 
multiple dilemmas – and one big 
‘trilemma’ (Martinelli 2019) – between 
sufficiency (meeting needs and delivering 
progressive goals), affordability 
(controlling costs and distributing them 
broadly) and advantage (simplifying 
complicated tax-benefit systems). The 
evidence suggests all three cannot be 
delivered at once. The complex 
administrative compromises required to 
simultaneously fulfil conflicting promises 
would reduce UBI to a powerful new tax 
engine pulling along a tiny cart. 
4. The problem with work 
One of the deepest divides is in relation to 
work. Whilst UBI promises liberation from 
work, its current deployment in multiple 
experiments in places facing the threat of 
automation – from Barcelona to Finland – 
is to help under- or unemployed people 
find jobs. So which is it: freedom from 
work or support back into work? It cannot 
be both. Moreover, either option contains 
contradictions.  
First, a fully-automated post-work society 
with citizens sustained by UBI leaves us in 
a predicament over who pays. A ‘robot 
tax’ – endorsed by Bill Gates – is one 
option. This forces us to radically rethink 
how the state can capture and redistribute 
the economic surpluses produced by 
productivity gains driven by technological 
advances in robotics, artificial intelligence 
and big data – especially considering 
Silicon Valley’s impressive knack at tax 
avoidance.  
UBI risks becoming a public subsidy for 
asset-owners – not least enabling the tech 
giants to continue exploiting gig workers 
and zero-hour contractors while extracting 
value from the free labour that produces 
data and avoiding paying the taxes 
required to fund a UBI in the first place. 
Second, although forecasts of a looming 
‘tsunami’ of automation-fuelled 
unemployment may well be overblown – 
evidence suggests technological change 
creates as many new jobs as it destroys – 
we nonetheless face the challenge of 
transitioning into a new economy with 
different kinds of work, unequally 
distributed between places and social 
classes. UBI alone cannot help people 
find more meaningful work or new jobs – it 
simply is not cut out to do that, as 
researchers found in the Barcelona and 
Finnish experiments. 
What we need instead is to get ahead of 
the curve of automation to create new jobs 
and make sure people have the skills and 
infrastructure to access them. This 
requires significant renewed state 
investment in technological innovation, 
place-based industrial strategy, lifelong 
education, public services, and 
infrastructure (from green energy to 
broadband). 
5. Beyond UBI: Universal Basic 
Services 
An alternative to UBI, then, lies in 
Universal Basic Services (UBS) – a 
concept developed by researchers at 
University College London in 2017. This is 
the idea that those basic human needs 
that are universal (in transcending cultural 
differences) and foundational to individual 
wellbeing and social flourishing – nutrition, 
shelter, mobility and access to 
information, alongside health and social 
care and education – are too important to 
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be left to the whims of the market and 
therefore best provided by services 
directly funded through public investment.   
UBS avoids many of the problems 
associated with the market that UBI 
perpetuates (Lombardozzi and Pitts 
2019). UBS is a more direct form of UBI – 
a ‘social wage’ that cuts out the 
middleman and saves people money 
otherwise spent on essentials. Whereas 
UBI atomises and privatises, UBS is ‘pro-
social’ in that it strengthens the ties of 
reciprocity, solidarity and sociability that 
help bind society into a functional and 
cohesive whole. By pooling resources and 
governing shared public goods as 
commons, UBS would enhance social 
citizenship, increase interaction and raise 
levels of trust in society.  
UBS brings the ‘hidden abode’ of 
production out into the visible public 
sphere through provision of childcare, 
adult and social care. UBI may offer 
financial support for people to continue 
doing the socially valuable yet under-
valued work of caring for children, the 
elderly and vulnerable, as well as 
domestic labour in the home and 
volunteering in the community – work 
often done by women. But it does not 
necessarily lead to greater gender 
equality, more equitable divisions of 
labour or a revaluation of paid and unpaid 
roles – just as it cannot by itself generate 
new jobs.  
UBS, though, does create new 
employment. And it provides the material 
foundations for the structural revaluation 
of work in society – as highlighted by the 
newfound respect for key workers during 
this pandemic – in ways UBI only formally 
could. 
UBS need not be delivered by an all-
powerful centralised state but could be 
coordinated locally and democratically 
though socialised markets and 
progressive procurement favouring 
cooperatives, social enterprises and 
charities as providers of publicly-funded 
basic services. Inspiration can be drawn 
from various ‘new municipalist’ 
experiments around the world, including 
the Preston Model – an economic 
approach developed by the city council 
with other partners aimed at building, 
democratising and retaining wealth within 
the community. 
6. Concluding thoughts for the 
Liverpool City Region 
Any UBI or UBS programme will always 
be embedded in particular places, 
interacting with different contextual 
conditions. In so uneven an economic 
geography as the UK’s, the impacts of 
such policies would vary significantly 
between localities with opposing 
socioeconomic problems, decoupling 
economies and diverging labour market 
trajectories. Liverpool’s will have to be 
designed and implemented very differently 
to London’s, for instance – underlining the 
need for devolved place-based 
programmes. 
Had Labour won the 2019 general 
election, former Shadow Chancellor John 
McDonnell intended to roll out UBI trials in 
several English cities – notably in 
Liverpool. The Liverpool City Region is 
also the ideal laboratory for experimenting 
with a devolved UBS through building the 
capacity of its flourishing social economy, 
backed by innovative forms of place-
based industrial strategy. 
Crucially, renewed investment in basic 
services would enhance resilience by 
increasing the capacity of the state to 
respond to shocks and crises such as 
global pandemics. It would save lives and 
money and solve social problems in the 
long run, by channelling resources into 
prevention rather than cure, resolving 
issues upstream before they can flood our 
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clinical and frontline services with 
unmanageable levels of demand. 
UBI would still have a role to play. It can 
act as a short-term measure to deal with 
immediate epidemiological and economic 
shocks; and as a transitional bridge taking 
us towards a more ambitious vision for a 
revitalised public sphere and proactive 
entrepreneurial state capable of tackling 
the complex multi-scalar challenges of 
ecological breakdown and technological 
transition. 
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